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TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)  
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,  
FEBRUARY 13, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department  
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-045.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 13, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 11:00 A.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY

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[1](#)3. (S) At a small group meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin on February 13, the sides discussed their respective views on the use of hard, soft, and "hybrid" covers that include a combination of hard and soft components during the warhead inspection portion of a Type-1 inspection. The Russian side stated its intent to develop conforming soft covers for all reentry vehicles, and assured the U.S. side that it considered the unitary Trident D-5 reentry vehicle cover with individual towers to cover the RVs/warheads to be a device that has "individual" covers for the RVs/warheads carried by the D-5 missiles. This assurance prompted both sides to agree to the removal of the bracketed word "individual" in paragraph 15 of Section VI to Part Five of the Protocol. End Summary.

[1](#)4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Soft Covers, Hard Covers, and Hybrid Covers.

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SOFT COVERS, HARD COVERS, AND HYBRID COVERS  
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15. (S) Warner explained the U.S. view on what constituted soft covers, hard covers, and hybrid covers, the latter of which included a combination of hard and soft components, using examples drawn from U.S. and Russian practices under START. The front section cover used on U.S. Trident missiles (stiff composite material with no flexibility), he said, was a hard cover. The Minuteman front section "witch's hat" covers for the individual RVs carried by the MMIII were soft covers. The SS-25 cover (canvas with hard components and metal stays) was a hybrid cover. He sought Russian agreement on these concepts as a departure point for discussion. With assurance from Col Petrov, Ilin said these descriptions were valid.

16. (S) Warner asked if the Russian side planned to employ hybrid covers containing both hard and soft elements during warhead inspections under START Follow-on (SFO). Petrov explained that the foremost Russian principle was that a cover should never interfere with an inspector's ability to confirm the number of warheads. As such, Russia was looking at developing new types of covers which were more conformal than those they had employed under START. Since there were no fixed dimensions for a reentry vehicle, Petrov

did not see any point in measuring covers. Although he indicated that the Russian side did not want to use the type of barrel-shaped hybrid cover which was used on the SS-25 during START, he later asked if the United States would agree with the continued use of such a hybrid cover. (Begin comment: This appeared to imply that the Russian side may continue to use the same JCIC-approved SS-25 hybrid cover until development of a more conforming cover is complete. End comment.) Warner indicated that the SS-25 hybrid cover was still acceptable.

17. (S) Warner concurred with the Russian proposal that RV covers would not be measured if they were soft. If a hybrid cover were developed, he argued, the United States believed that such hybrid covers should be demonstrated and measured in their full-up configuration and that the hard elements within these covers would remain subject to measurement during each warhead inspection. He noted that the United States had conducted a demonstration of the Trident II D-5 hard cover under START and anticipated that the Russian inspectors would continue to measure the Trident II hard cover during SFO Type-1 warhead inspections.

18. (S) Petrov added that the Russian side still intended to show the inspecting Party any soft covers before they were placed over the warheads during an inspection. However, no measuring of these soft covers would be permitted. He claimed the viewing of the cover prior to the warhead inspection should help to erase any doubt an inspector might have about the ability of the cover to conceal more than the stated number of RVs on a front section.

19. (S) Warner restated the U.S. position that soft covers should not be measured, but that hybrid and hard covers should be measured. This procedure, he stated, should be included in the Annex on Inspection Activities. Ilin asked what components of the hybrid covers would be measured, fully admitting that he was not an expert in this area. Warner explained that only the hard components of the hybrid cover would be measured.

¶10. (S) Warner asked if the Russians could agree that the Trident D-5 unitary hard cover included a series of individual towers that are "individual" covers under the description and context of paragraph 15 of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. Petrov said that he did not think there was any problem with the United States employing the same cover used in START and considering it to contain a number of "individual" covers. Col Zaitsev added that the Russian Federation would appreciate the U.S. demonstration of the D-5 hard cover to be used in SFO, which Warner had offered earlier. Warner suggested that with this agreement on the character of the U.S. hard covers used with the Trident D-5, the bracket could be removed on the word "individual" in paragraph 15 of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. He also noted that brackets would remain around the language on taking measurements on covers in that section until both sides had consulted with their capitals on dropping the requirement for measuring soft covers.

¶11. (S) Ilin asked what would be discussed at the next IPWG meeting. Warner said the United States had not yet received additional guidance from Washington on the conduct of Type-2 elimination inspections, so he suggested the Working Group begin work on the Annex to the Protocol on Inspection Activities. Ilin said he was willing to do so, but only in the event that the sides had not received guidance from capitals on issues related to Core inspections. Warner agreed with this approach and underscored that there were still several serious issues to be addressed, to include Type-2 inspections at Core facilities and the conversion of individual launchers for SLBMs. Ilin agreed that these were some

of the issues, but said that both sides should move to discussion of the Annex if no guidance was received on the unresolved issues.

¶12. (U) Documents provided: None

¶13. (U) Participants:

#### UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner

Mr. Buttrick

LTC Litterini

Mr. Rust

Ms. Gesse (Int)

#### RUSSIA

Col Ilin

LTC Lyasovskiy

Col Petrov

Ms. Vodopolova

Col Zaitsev

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
KING